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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BESSIE AUERBACH) MADELINE I E 0 
A. WERNER" and SELJ'fA 1· L 
~rOHR, r., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, ;! 1 ~ 1950 
-vs.- -~·~-·---·-··-·1 C~,:.r,;:, 
FANNIE F~ A. SAMUELS, L. R. 
SAMUELS. and FREDERICK FOX 
AUERBACH, and FANNIE F. A. Case No. 9090 
SAl\lCELS, L. R4 SAMUELS, 
FREDERICK FOX AUERB .. t\.CH, 
and WALKER BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, as Trustees of the Test-
amentary Trust created under the 
terms of the Last Will and Testament 
of FREDERICK S~ AUERBACH, 
deceased, 
DefendantJ and Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS 
C. M. GILMOUR~ 
Kearns Building) 
Salt Lake City~ Utah 
REICHMAN, VERNO~ & BENNETT~ 
Keams Building_, 
Salt Lake City~ Utah 
SHEARMAN & STERLING & WRIGHT~ 
20 Exchange Place, 
New York 5, New York 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BESSIE AUERBACH, ~-f.L~DELINE 
A. WERNER, and SELh1A A. 
~v10HR, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants~ 
-vs.-
FANNIE F. AL SAMUELS, L. R. 
Si\\lUELS, and ~FREDERICK FOX 
1\UERBACH, and FANNIE F. i\. Case No. 9090 
SAiv1UELS1 L. R4 S ~~ M U E L S, 
FREDERICK FOX A"CERB.:~CH, 
and \\-~ALKER BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY~ as Trustees of the Test-
amentary Trust created under the 
terms of the Last Will and Testament 
of FREDERICK S. AUERBACH, 
deceased, 
Defendants and Respondents4 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS 
A. 
In an attempt to create a false atmosphere of candor 
and fairness on the part of Fannie, the respondents refer: 
to Fannie's statement in her petition to the Court of :~Vfay 
161 1940 that she was t~willing to a bide by the construct-
ion of said \vill by this court, and the application thereto 
of the facts, which shall be found by the court. 1 ) {Respon-
dents br. p. 6) *; to the District Court's order of May 21 ~ 
•Pag-: rd'en:nces are to respond.r:nts' brief, unless otherwise indica tedT 
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1940, (entered on Fannie~s petition) exonerating her from 
liability to the plain tiffs on account of the specific leg-
acies ( pp. 7-8) ; and to Fannie,s statement in 1939 or 
1940 that .r.r.there wasn,t enough left for you girls to get 
each $1 0,000'' as something which the Court ~(did in fact 
find. ~' ( p. 16 ) 
The respondents, however, ignore the fact that the 
May 1940 proceeding was not an adversary proceeding at 
which plaintiffs were hcardr There was no adverse party 
present at the hearing to point out to the Court that the 
calculations used by Fannie in her petition were improper 
and would unjustly deprive plaintiffs of their legacies .. 
Fannie's conduct, as was pointed out in plaintiffs, 
main brief, caused them to refrain from appearing at the 
May 1940 hearing, thus making it, in effect, an ex parte 
hearing.. In this connection, the following statement of 
the Court in In re Ricffs Estate~ 11 "Ltah 428 (discussed 
at pp .. 26-27 of Appellants~ br.) in pertinent: 
u: •• ~ There is an admitted exception to this general 
rule in cases where~ by reason of something done by 
the successful party to a suit, there was in fact no ad-
versary trial or decision of the issue in the case. . . 
Equity will relieve: one seeking relief from the 
effect of a judgment or decree procured by the con-
duct of the successful party which prevents the in-
jured party from appearing at the trial or hearing on 
the merits.), 
B. 
Respondents state (p. 15): the plaintiffs' sole objec-
tion to the order of 1 940 is that they believe the Court 
and Fannie were in error in makjng the computation in 
that they improperly deducted taxes; and that plaintiffs 
contend nothing more than an error by a court. This 
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statement is erroneous. Apparently'j respondents have not 
read plaintiffs1 brief very carefully. On page 30 of their 
brief, plaintiffs request relief, for example: ~~on the 
grounds of either extrinsic fraud or mistake~ or both.~!' 
c. 
Respondents do not deny: that in 1939 or 1940 }'annie 
told the plaintiff, Madeline Werner, and her sister~ Jennie 
... -\uerbach, deceased, that there was not enough in :Fred-
erick,s estate for the {'girls to get each ~ 10,000''; nor thal 
Herbert told F aiUlie that he had to explain to plaintiffs 
that they were not going to receive any inheritance from 
Frederick,s estate, "because the net amount doesn~t come 
up to the specified amounf'; nor that :Fannic~s attorney 
told plaintiffs~ attorney that the value of the estate 
''proved to be under $350,000.J' 
Madeline Werner acted on behalf of her sisters, Bessie 
Auerbach and Selma Mohr, the other plaintiffs herein, 
and managed their affairs. (Apps.) Deps. p. 15~ ln 8-29; 
p. 61,. In 13-21 ) And, the plaintiffs relied on Herbert, 
F annie,s confidant* to look after their interests in Salt 
Lake City4 (Apps.' Deps. p. 10, ln 7-9; p~ 61, ln 26-29; 
p. 105, ln 24-30; P~ 106, ln 1-4) 
~ 
Under all of the circumstances, the plaintiffs made no 
inquiry of anyone 1 with respect to their rights or interest 
in Frederick's estate, from the date of hill death in 1938 
until immediately prior to the commencement of this 
action in 1957. (Bessie Dep. p. 35, ln 18-29; Selma Dcp~ 
•Re:iipondcnt:s a:eem to object to plaintiffs~ reference in their brief to Herbert 
as "Fannie~s confidane, (br. p. 31). But) Fannie hcrsdf, testified upon h.er 
deposition that Herbert was her ''confidant'~ { p. 11, 1 n 2 5 ; pT 21 ~ 1 n 29 ) , 
and funher that Herbert was the om: with whom she 11 disc us:sed c:vP.:ry-
thing with, more so than with Jim {her lawycrft (p+ 58, 1 n 2 7-30; p. ·59 
ln 1-3. (Brackets added} 1 
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p .. 86, ln 29-30; p. 87, ln 1-11, 27-28; n1adeline Dep. p. 
120, ln 24-30; P~ 121, ln. 1-5; p. 133, ln 28-30; p. 134~ 
ln 1-13) There \Vas no need for plaintiffs to inquire of 
others concerning their interest in Frederick\ estate. 
They had full confidence in r"'annir. and relied upon her 
to do the right thing~ 
In this connection, Selma te~tif i ed upon her depos-
ition, as follows (p. 87, ln 8~17) : 
Q~ 'r ou didn't make any inquiry of Herbert 
while he wa.s alive:J 
A. No. 
Q~ You didn't make any inquiry of Fan or Lcs? 
A. No~ ~ever would make any inquiry of them. 
Q. Why not? 
i\~ I wouldn~t~ 
Q~ \V.hy not? 
Ar Well~ I just felt that we had confidence in 
Fannie~ that if anything was coming to us that she 
would eventual!}) give it to us . . /J 
Bessie similarly testified (p. 40, ln 9-13) : 
~'Q.. Going back to this, you make the statement 
or the charge that because of all these things you 
were mi.s1ed. No\v how \Vf"re you misled? 
A. Well~ I thought Fannie vvould do as Fred 
asked her naturally. Fred left the ten thousand; I 
thought she as his executrix would carry out his 
wishes.'~ 
And, Madeline testified (p~ 155, ln 16-23) ~ 
'"Q.. \·~ou knew in 1940 that you were to receive 
some money under the will, did you not? 
A~ Just from what Herbert had said~ I would 
never have asked Fannie. I considered she had been 
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brought up to do the right thing. I have known her 
since she was 12 years ,_;old, and I would think ulti-
mately we would get it ..... ,, 
Mr. Otter bourg also testified { Otterbourg Dep. ) : 
''Q. In any event, in June of 1946, you did kno\v 
at that time that Frederick had left in his will be-
quests to the girls, isn~t that correct? 
A. Y Ps, 1 knevv that.. 
Q. And you knew that these bequests were in 
the sum of S 10,000 apiece? 
.~.\. Y cs~ I knc\v that. 
Q~ And you kncv..~ the general provisions as to 
the bequests~ general terms of the bequests? 
i\.. I knew in a general 'vay if the e.state "vas 
large enough, they'd get it; and if it \·vas not, they 
\vould not." ( p. ~11 ) 
Again, with respect to lvf r~ Ingcbretsen~s reply dated 
July 18. 1946, to his letter of July 12~ 1946: 
~~Q~ 'Verc you satisfied '"~ith the ans\vcrs that 
you received? 
,\. Surely; surely. 
Q. Did you for\Nard this information that you 
had in this letter to the girls? 
A. I don~t remember that I fonvarded it~ no. 
My recollection is that at some time or other, not 
thenJ because I'm sure they ~rete not here in ~ c"':o 
\"~ork, but at some time or other, I may have mention-
~d it in passing, ''It is too b~?' but there isn,t enough 
1n your estate for a legacy.. At some time. mavbe. 
(pp~ 50-1) ~ ~ 
Again, 
''Q. So, as far as you were concerned you just 
let the matter drop after receiving the letter from 
Ingebretsen? 
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A. As far as I was concerned the situation was 
that Mr. Ingebretsen, who had' been the family 
COW1sel and who had been in the confidence of all 
these people all these years and who had been Her-
bert~s lawyer~ wrote me these facts and I saw no need 
to question it anv further, as far as I was concerned, 
or to advise him; so we did not discuss it. 1 relied on 
his statement., (pp~ 53-4) (Emphasis added) 
Again, 
''Q. Did Mrs. Weruer ever ask you as to whether 
you received an answer to your letter of July 12 .. 
1946? 
A. I think not, but I am not sure of that. I know 
I must have told her~ and thafs my recollection, but 
I would not know just when, at some point 'vhen they 
got back from their vacation or something, ~'It 
wasn't more than $350,000 in the estate:~ that was 
too bad.:~' (p. 60) (Emphasis added) 
Against the clear, undisputed and sworn testimony~ 
first of plaintiffs that they had full faith and confidence in 
their sister-in-law, Fannie, and were relyjng on her to do 
the right thing, second, of plaintiffs~ attorney that here· 
lied without question on the written statement of Fannie's 
attorney that there was not enough in the estate to pay 
the legacies, third~ of plaintiffs, attorney that he com-
mWlicated this information to 1\.frs. \-Verner and, fourth, of 
Fannie herself that both she and Herbert informed plain-
tiffs there was not enough left for the girls to get each 
$10,000,-against all this-j can Fannie now be heard 
to argue plaintiffs were not lulled into inaction as a result 
of her misrepresentations? No other inference is possible 
on the facts but that the misrepresentations of value were 
in fact made to plaintiffs and \\~"ere in fact relied upon by 
plain tiffs. 
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We recall again the decision of this court in the Rice 
case that an cxecutor"s petition misconstruing the amount 
of a legacy is extrinsic fraud (a fortiori -vvhere the executor 
stands to profit by the act). We also emphasize again 
under the doctrine of that case and the others cited by 
plaintiffs, that Fannie's admitted misrepresentations are 
not being ''tortured into extrinsic fraud~' as stated by 
respondents. Such misrepresentations caused plaintiffs 
to think they had no interest in the e.sta te, I u lied them 
into inaction and permitted :Fannie to obtain plaintiffst 
property. Such misrepresentations constitute and are 
extrinsic fraud under the applicable "Ctah authorities. 
They also clearly had the effect of ddaying any suit by 
pia in tiffs until discovery of the mistake in J Wle, 195 7. 
D. 
Respondents contend (pp. 37-38) that Frederick in-
tended that the estate and inheritance taxes be deducted 
from the gross estate in computing the net value of his 
estate~ They state (p~ 37): that Frederick wished that 
a minimum sutn of $350,000 be placed in trust for F'annie 
and her son to assure them of an annual income of 
$1 7,500; and argue, in substance, that if taxes were de~ 
ducted from the value of the estate that Fannie and her 
son might not obtain this minimum protection. 
However, at pages 16-1 7 of their brief~ respondents 
take a contrary view. 1""hcre the respondents assert that 
Fredercik gave Herbert a right under the will to purchase 
for one dollar all of the Auerbach store stock (valued at 
$473,100.34 in Fannie's May 16, 1940 petition), and 
that if Herbert exercised this right, the value of the estate 
would have been depleted by over $300,000. Thus, based 
upon respondents' ovro analysis of the will (par~ Fifth ) , it 
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is clear that Frederick never intended that a minllnum 
sum of $350~000 be placed in trust for the benefit of 
Fannie and her son. 
Moreover, Frederick left Fatmie insurance in the sum 
of $121 , 485.1 0 and real property worth $12,77 5 .50j there-
by assuring her of a substantial ''nest egg~'~ We submit 
that respondents' above contention is erroneous and is, 
also, contrary to the drrect holding of the Court in In re 
Missetfs Will~ 136 ~.Y.S. 2d 923 (cited at p. 19 of pitffs~ 
brief). 
E~ 
Respondents object to the reference in plaintiffs) brief 
to the Federal Estate Tax Return \vhich 'vas produced 
by respondents~ attorneys upon Fannie's deposition. Re-
spondents claim it is not clear for what purpose plaintiffs 
refer to the tax retwn, that the tax return is irrelevant 
and immaterial, that any reference to the document is 
improper, that respondents expressly refused to stipulate 
the return \vas an accurate copy of the one actually filed 
for the estate~ and finally that the return was not produced 
~:subject to verification)' as stated in plaintiffs~ brief at 
page 9. 
The Federal tax return was 'Willingly produced by 
respond cnts~ attorney, Mr. Col ton, at the de position to 
assist plaintiffs' attorneys in their examination of Fannie. 
It was secured by 1vlr ~ Colton from the estate" s files in the 
possession of the a ttorncys for the estate~ It was assumed 
by Mr. Colton to be a true copy of the return actually 
filed by }i~annie for the estate. Although refusing to stip-
ulate that the return could be admitted into evidence 
until verified further, Mr. Colton did stipulate at the 
deposition that it was his understanding the document vvas 
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a true and accurate copy of the estate tax return. Cross-
examination of Fannie on the basis of the return as pro-
duced thus proceeded .subject only to the right in respon-
dents' attorneys to verify the complete accuracy of the 
return before its formal admission into evidence. Thi~~ 
appears from the following colloquy of counsel in Fannie's 
dcposi tion : 
''Mr. Rosen:* Can we concede for the record 
that the United States Estate Tax Return on the 
estate of Frederick Samuel Auerbach~ signed by :vf rs. 
Samuels as the executrix~ sho,vs a tota] gross estate 
for tax purposes of $620~857 .98 and ... 
MrL Colton: **Now before you go any further, 
because I will have to identify the source of this and 
I hadn't gone to the original: I assume this is a true 
copy of the one filed. This \vas obtained by me from 
the firm of Ray, l~a\vlins) Henderson and Jones~ and 
it was a part of their file that they gave me; that is, 
they gave me the pleadings and that4 I assume it is an 
a ccuratc copy but I don~ t knovv; I \\70uld rather not 
stipula tc. ~, ( p. 79) 
Again, 
~'Mr. Colton: '\' es, but my qualification knocks 
o~t the entire stipulation. I will stipulat(: at this 
ttme that it is our understandingj it is a true and 
accurate copy of the estate tax return/) (p~ 80) 
Again, 
''Mr. Colton: l\ ow wait, 1 will not stipulate we 
can admit this in evidence lllltil we verify it further .. 
(p. 80) 
Again, 
''Mr4 Gihnour~ ~1r. Rosen, it might assist Mr~ 
Colton in his problem to know that the tax computed 
~--
.Representing Plaintiffs. 
~._R~presenting R-r:spond ents. 
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on that return is the same dollars and cents figures 
as sho\VIl in the court file as having been paid to the 
Federal Govermnent for estate taxes. 
Mr. Rosen: will that help you, Mr. Colton? 
Mr. Colton: It would be very interesting. I have 
no reason to doubt it is an accuraie copy:J b-ut the 
source it came to me, it should be verified before we 
enter any stipulation about the document~' (pp. 
81-2) (Emphasis added) 
From the foregoing, it is thus clear that the statement 
in plaintiffs~ brief { p. 9) that a copy of the F edcr al tax 
return of the estate was produced by Mr. Colton upon 
Fannie's deposition (subject to verification) is quite accu~ 
rate and that the statement in respondents' brief (p. 42) 
that the return \.vas not introduced •'"sub ject to verifica-
tion ~' is quite inaccurate. 
We mention this for the reason that respondents at .. 
tempt to distract the court and brush away the tax return 
as "rrrevelant and immaterial.'' To the contrary the tax 
return was pertinent to the issues raised in the pleadings. 
Plaintiffs wished to show~ it1 the first place, as alle,ged in 
the complaint, that the Federal estate tax of $89~018.19 
deducted in full by Farurie in computing net value for the 
purpose of plaintiffs' legacies~ in fact included a large 
portion of tax on the large non-testamentary assets of 
insurance and jointly held property (approximating 
$134,000400). This, as alleged) vlas shovm. Plaintiffs 
also \vished to show the basic and inherent incongruity of 
Fannie sho\ving a net estate one minute, of $55 7 )950 to 
the Federal Govcrrunent and then turning around and 
showing a net estate the next minute to the court of only 
$3301382i both net values being determinable (except for 
the non~testamentary assets) on e s sentialz,_, the .rame basis 
of computation as of the same date~ namely), date of death. 
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The tax return, of course, would have no pertinence on 
values at time of distribution but the question of values 
at time of distribution is not here in issue .. * 
•Fannie and her husband, as co-trustees, took O"V"tt the residue of the es.tate 
at a ,,.alue of $45J,979.96 at the tim-~: of di:nributior.. as shown on pages 
13-14 o£ plaiot~ffs' brief. 
F. 
Respondents contend (pp .. 13-14) that the reference 
by plaintiffs to the memorandum opinion of the trial 
court is improper and should be disregarded. However, 
their authori tics do not support this contention. 
Grand Central 1.VIr Co .. V~ Mammoth Af. Co., 29 Utah 
49~ BJ Pac~ 648 is entirely different from the facts herein 
involved. There the Court refused to permit appellants 
to establish error on the basis of the lower Court] s opinion, 
written before judgment. However, it did not preclude 
counsel from citing the opinion on the appeal, saying 
(p. 684}: 
~' .. ~ Nor is his act in delivering such an opinion 
one upon which error can be predicated) although 
counsel may cite the document in argument.~' (Em-
phasis added) 
Plaintiffs~ right to refer to the memorandum opinion 
in their brief is further supported by another of the cases 
cited by respondents, namely, Terry u~ Terry~ 70 Idaho 
161, 213 Pr2d 906. There the Court said (p~ 910}: 
'' .. 4 4This Court has considered it not improper 
in_ order to call attention to the the cry adopted by the 
trial court to refer to the memorandum decision.'' 
(Emphasis added) 
The plaintiffs, here, have cited the memorandum 
opinion to indicate the basis of the trial Court~s judgment. 
Thus) even under the Grand Central and Terry cases~ 
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supraJ cited by respondents, plaintiffs' reference \vas per-
fectly proper. 
Nor does Victor M. Co .. v .. National Bank, 18 Utah 
87, 55 Pac. 72 support the proposition for which it is cited 
by respondents. It held merely that the lower Courfs 
opinion could not be regarded as a Hfinding of factsrn 
Actually, the Court, in referring to the opinion; stated 
that it {p~ 73) : 
'' ~ . . rna y be of great im portancc on account of 
the information which it imparts respecting the I egal 
principles which govern the court and should guide 
the 1 i tigants. .. . ~' 
Respondents rely heavi1y on L. Romano Engineering 
Corp. t. State, 8 Wash~ 2d 670, 113 P.2d 549 ( 1941) for 
the proposition that any subsPquent statement by the 
lower Court should have no effect on the judgment. 
Again, the facts in that case bear no resemblance to those 
before this Court. There the memorandum opinion \vas 
written {p. 553) : 
"After the record in the case was complete, the 
judgment made and filed~ notice of appeal given, and 
the sta tern en t of fa c t.s certi ficd. ~' 
Here the memorandum opinion \vas 'vritten on June 
5~ 1959, only a few days after judgment n~as entered 
(May 28~ 1959), and long before the notice of appeal and 
designation of the record on appeal were filed. 
Additionally) the Court, in the Romano case, found 
the opinion to be nothing more than a ~~colloquy bet\'\~een 
court and counsel1 ~. In the instant case the memorandum 
opinion is not the result of mere ('"colloquy~"~"~ It is a 
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determination made by the Court upon all of the evidence 
previously presented to it by both parties on the hearing 
he 1 d on :\1 a y 7 , 1 9 59. 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs arc not citing the mem-
orandum opinion to qualify or limit the judgment bur.~ as 
we have indicated, to call the attention of this Court to 
the basis of the lo,ver Courfs judgment. We submit that 
this is entirely proper and in accord with the authorities, 
including those cited by respondents. 
The other authorities cited by the respondents, for 
similar reasons, have no application. 
G. 
Respondents seek to avoid the principles laid down 
by the authorities cited by plaintiffs at pages 25-29 of 
their brief by contending that the facts are e.ntirely diff-
erent from the case at bar (pp. 19~23).. Contrary to re-
spondents' contention, we submit) that a study of the facts 
in these authorities will reveal a striking resemblance to 
those present here. 
Further, respondents assert (p. 20) that since Fannie 
petitioned the Court for an interpretation of the \Vill~ 
her conduct was in accord with a statement made by the 
Court in Rice v. Rice_, 117 Utah 27. Respondents~ asser-
tion~ hovlever~ is misleading. They attempt to support 
their position by relying upon a statement in the opinion 
taken entirely out of context .. It is clear from the opinion 
that the Court had in mind an Hintcrprctation of the war) 
based upon an adversary proceeding and not a proceed-
ing such as the May 1940 proceeding involved herein~ 
We submit that the authorities cited in plaintiffs~ brief 
are applicable and fully support plaintiffs' position herein~ 
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H. 
The cases cited by respondents (pp. 25-36) for the 
proposition that plaintiffs are barred by the statute of 
limitations and laches are not in point. Those cases do not 
in valve extrinsic fraud~ or mistake_, or both !I :such as is here 
present. They are not applicable .. 
CONCLUSION 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BELO\Y 
SHOULD BE REVERSED AND PLAINTIFFS~ 
MOTION FOR SC:VIMARY JUDGlviEN1~ 
GRANTED4 
Respectfully submitted~ 
C. M. GILMOUR~ 
Kearns Building) 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
REICHMAN~ \·!ERXON & BEX~ETT~ 
Kearn~ Building.l 
Salt Lake City~ "Utah 
SHEARMAN & STERLING & \VRIGHT~ 
20 Exchange Place; 
New York 5, New York 
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